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Since West African countries acceded independence in 1960, the economic per-formance of these countries has been strikingly low in comparison with other 
developing countries. This is what makes many observers refer to this as an “African 
tragedy.” Obviously, the need for understanding this tragedy is crucial. The eco-
nomic historian Paul Bairoch writes: “There is no doubt that a large number of 
negative structural features of the process of economic underdevelopment have his-
torical roots going back to European colonization” (Bairoch 1993, 88). Since 2000, 
a growing literature focuses on the interaction between colonialism and develop-
ment. Several empirical papers have tested the impact of colonial history on devel-
opment paths and, for the best clarity, I classify them into three groups according 
to their colonial dimension of interest. The first group of papers focuses on differ-
ences induced by colonizers’ identities. Raphael La Porta et al. (1999) and Daron 
Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2003) find that colonizing countries had an impact 
on the development path of former colonies through the nature of legal systems they 
imported to the colonies. Both give evidence that former English colonies benefit 
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History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public 
Investments in French West Africa†
By Elise Huillery*
To what extent do colonial public investments continue to influence 
current regional inequalities in French-speaking West Africa? Using 
a new database and the spatial discontinuities of colonial invest-
ment policy, this paper gives evidence that early colonial investments 
had large and persistent effects on current outcomes. The nature of 
investments also matters. Current educational outcomes have been 
more specifically determined by colonial investments in education 
rather than health and infrastructures, and vice versa. I show that a 
major channel for this historical dependency is a strong persistence 
of investments; regions that got more at the early colonial times con-
tinued to get more. (JEL  H41, H54, N37, N47, 016)
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from better institutions than former French colonies thanks to a more efficient legal 
system inherited from colonial times. A second group of papers focuses on the 
impact of European settlement. Acemoglu, Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001) 
show that former settlement colonies perform better than former extractive colonies 
because they inherited institutions that better protect private property rights. Finally, 
a third group of papers focuses on the impact of institutions induced by particular 
administrative rules. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer (2005) study the impact of 
the colonial land tenure system on the development of Indian districts. They provide 
evidence that districts in which property rights for land were given to cultivators 
now perform better than districts in which these rights were given to landlords. Iyer 
(2005) compares economic outcomes in India, across areas under the direct colo-
nial rule of British administrators with areas under indirect colonial rule. She finds 
that districts under direct colonial rule have significantly lower availability of public 
goods than districts under indirect colonial rule.
These last two papers differ from the others in the sense that they do not compare 
all former colonies but focus on one particular country, India. The authors argue 
that it allows them to locate the source of difference more easily, relative to the case 
where  former colonies have radically different historical, geographical, and cultural 
backgrounds, as well as different colonial histories. My paper follows the same idea. 
It focuses on one particular source of difference (colonial public investments) in one 
particular area (French West Africa). This region exhibits a noticeable homogeneity 
regarding its geographical, anthropological, cultural, and historical characteristics. 
Moreover, it was colonized only by France (which allows us to control for the colo-
nizer’s identity), in the same period (from the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
to 1960 ).1 The sources of difference between districts of former French West Africa 
are therefore easier to identify than between all former colonies. I compare the cur-
rent performances of French West African districts that received different levels of 
public investments during colonial times. This paper proposes an empirical frame-
work to estimate the long-term impact of public investments on spatial inequali-
ties. This is motivated by two underlying questions. First, what is the importance of 
colonial history relative to pre-colonial history and geography? Second, what are the 
long-term returns of public investments?
With respect to the existing literature, this paper innovates in underlining the role 
of public investments rather than the more general role of institutions. Institutions 
are commonly viewed as providing a general favorable environment for develop-
ment, but it is not clear in what precise way they encourage economic development. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) push ahead the interpretation of insti-
tutional overhang, but it is generally impossible to distinguish between the vari-
ous potential channels of institutions’ influence. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Iyer 
(2005) give evidence that the effect of the land tenure system and colonial rule on 
productivity in India is indirect. Partially relying on their effect on current invest-
ments, they argue that the differences in current economic outcomes are largely 
due to differences in current investments. Focusing on public investments, therefore, 
1 Guinea acceded independence in 1958, whereas the other colonies of French West Africa acceded indepen-
dence in 1960.
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contributes to precisely why long-term history matters. The results are robust when 
controlling for country fixed effects, which captures the effect of institutions, so I am 
investing a very distinct channel for persistence of differences in the colonial period. 
Another advantage of this paper is the use of a first-hand dataset that matches direct 
and precise historical data with current data on districts. Colonial and pre-colo-
nial data come from historical archives found in Paris and Dakar, whereas recent 
data come from national household surveys performed in the middle of the 1990s. I 
matched both using the geographical coordinates of the surveyed households’ local-
ity and very precise colonial maps of each district.
Colonial times introduced important differences between the districts of former 
French West Africa. Colonial investments in education, health, and infrastructure 
were indeed very unequal among districts. Figures 1 and 2 plot colonial investment 
and 1995 performances. They show a strong relationship between colonial invest-
ment and outcomes today. But the relationship between colonial investment and 
current development cannot be taken as conclusive evidence since pre-colonial char-
acteristics could have influenced both colonial investment and development paths, 
resulting in bias estimates of the causal effect of public investment on current devel-
opment. French colonial power could have invested more in the most prosperous 
districts, which would have reached a higher level of development than the poor ones 
anyway. To overcome this potential selection bias, I use a number of strategies in this 
paper. First, I exploit proxies of the potential determinants of colonial investment, 
which can be classified into three groups: geographical factors, pre-colonial factors, 
and characteristics of colonial conquest. Access to a detailed history explains how 
variations came about. OLS regressions, including these proxies, give a first estimate 
of the impact of colonial investments on current development controlling for main 
pre-colonial characteristics. Second, I use historic data on pre-colonial population 
densities and political development to examine whether it was the most developed 
parts of West Africa that selected into colonial investments. Evidence shows that 
was not the case. Third, I use the geographical discontinuities of colonial policy 
in order to circumvent the problem of the omitted variables. The autonomy of the 
French districts’ administrators and the arbitrariness of colonial borders actually 
lead to accidental variations between neighbor districts. Some unobservable char-
acteristics that may not be captured by OLS controls should be, in fact, similar for 
neighbor districts, so differences in outcomes between neighbor districts are more 
likely to be due to differences in colonial public investments.
Results show that colonial public investments have been a strong determinant 
of current districts’ development. Colonial investments in a certain type of public 
good (education, health, or infrastructures) between 1910 and 1928 explain about 30 
percent of the corresponding current performance. Moreover, the nature of invest-
ments matters. Current educational performances are more specifically determined 
by colonial investments in education, current health performances by colonial 
investments in health, and current infrastructure’s development by colonial public 
works. I also find lower but significant cross effects of health investments on con-
nection to electricity and access to a private water tap. According to my estimates, 
the  long-term impact of colonial investments is very high. The path of public invest-
ments from 1910 to 1939 shows that districts that received greater investment in 
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early times received more than the others later, which shows differences did not 
narrow over time. I find the fact that investments continued to be concentrated in 
areas that already had many of them is more likely due to the lasting nature of physi-
cal facilities and positive externalities on local demand for public goods rather than 
externalities across investments, political externalities, or appropriation of public 
investments by political power.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I describes historical background and 
investment policy under French rule in West Africa. Section II describes data and 
gives some summary statistics on current development, colonial investments, and dis-
tricts’ characteristics. Section III describes the empirical approach used to estimate the 
impact of colonial investments on development paths. The main empirical results are 
reported and discussed in Section IV. Section V discusses the mechanisms that might 
explain the persistence of the effect of colonial investments. Section VI concludes.
I. Historical Background: French Colonization
A. French political Control of West Africa
French West Africa officially lasted 65 years, from 1895 to 1960. Empirically, 
military expansion lasted from 1854 to 1903, pacification from 1854 to 1929, and 
effective occupation from 1904 to 1960.
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Figure 1. The Correlation between Colonial Investments in Education and 
Current Educational Outcomes
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The French first arrived in 1854, landing on the Senegalese coast, led by the 
famous General Louis Faidherbe. Colonial expansion in the 1850s began from the 
west of the region. The first military column went from the Senegalese coast east-
bound and arrived at the west side of what is currently Mali (Kayes, Satadougou in 
the late 1850s). A second military expansion was engaged during the 1850s north-
bound to what is currently Mauritania. A third military expansion took place along 
the Guinean coast (Conakry, Boffa, Boke, and Forecariah). South Dahomey was 
the only new expansion in the 1860s. No new expansion occurred during the 1870s. 
Main colonial expansion occurred in the 1880s from south to north and from west to 
east. In the 1890s, a last military column progressed from the southeast side of what 
is currently Mali, east as far as Lake Tchad, joined by a column progressing from 
Benin’s coasts, going north.
French West Africa was officially created in 1895 as a federation of colonies 
of West Africa. But the conquest was not yet achieved. The federal government 
became effective in 1904. Despite military control on the major part of the terri-
tory before 1900, there were no sensitive all day life modifications for local people 
before 1900–1910, except in a few coastal localities. Local chiefs’ prerogatives, in 
particular, were, in general, still intact, their military obedience being materialized 
by friendship treaties. Hostile chiefs suffered from French military repression. Civil 
administration took place progressively in the whole territory from 1900–1920. 
Thus, we can consider that an administrative occupation has been in effect in the 
major part of the territory from approximately 1910–1960.
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Figure 2. The Correlation between Colonial Investments in Health and  
Current Health Outcomes
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B. Financial and Administrative organization of French West Africa
The French colonial administration was structured as a pyramid. At the top of the 
pyramid was the general governor of the federation. Next, were Lieutenant gover-
nors, at the head of the colonies (Senegal, Guinea, Dahomey, Soudan, Upper-Volta, 
Ivory Coast, Niger, and Mauritania). Administrators were below lieutenant gover-
nors, at the head of the districts, about 15 per colony. In 1925, French West Africa 
had 120 districts (see Figure 3). The largest districts were divided into subdivisions 
that were also managed by French administrators (in 1925, there were 164 subdivi-
sions or districts, when the districts had no subdivision). At the bottom of the pyra-
mid, under French administrators, were African chiefs. The colonial administration 
nominated local chiefs as village’s chiefs and limited their influence to small areas.
In this pyramidal organization, the effective power was concentrated at the 
third stage. The district administrators were “the real chiefs of the French empire” 
(Robert Delavignette 1939). Their tasks, which included overseeing tax collection; 
representing the lieutenant governor in all official events; counting people living in 
the district; drawing up the district’s map; steering elementary schools; watching 
Koranic schools; planning and supervising the building of roads, bridges, wells, and 
tracks; arresting criminals and judging them according to the “native population 
code,” were very important.2 The official tasks of African chiefs were to collect 
taxes, recruit a workforce for hard labor, and recruit military reservists. The number 
of reservists to recruit and the amount of taxes to collect was defined by French 
district administrators. African chiefs were quartered to auxiliaries of French colo-
nial  administrators. The administrative organization was officially centralized but 
effectively decentralized. French district administrators could manage their local 
policy in an almost independent way thanks to physical distances and no means of 
communication. Neighbor districts could therefore experiment with different colo-
nial policies.
The French colonial financial system in West Africa was organized with three 
levels of budgets: the budget of the French Ministry of Colonies, French West 
Africa’s federal budget, and colonies’ local budgets. The budget of the French 
Ministry of Colonies was credited with metropolitan taxes and entirely devoted to 
military expenses. French West Africa’s federal budget was credited with custom 
duties generated by trade between the federation and the rest of the world. This 
budget had to cover three expenses: the running expenses of the general government 
and its central services, large-scale public works covering several colonies (mostly 
railway works), and subsidies to poor colonies (only Mauritania). Finally, the local 
budgets of the colonies were credited with local taxes. Each colony had to use its 
own resources to finance French colonization costs (except Mauritania, which ben-
efited from federal subsidies). According to the statistics I computed,3 60 percent of 
colonies’ budgets came from the capitation tax. Direct taxes (capitation tax, trading 
tax, and property tax) represented 89 percent of the total resources of the colonies. 
Local budgets had to cover all expenses except for military expenses and some of 
2 In French, called the “code de l’indigénat.” This code was exclusively devoted to African people. 
3 These statistics were calculated from the budgets of 71 districts in 8 colonies between 1907 and 1930.
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the biggest large-scale public works projects. The cost of colonization was endured 
by local populations rather than French taxpayers, and, more precisely, mostly by 
households rather than firms. The government and central services of the colonies 
absorbed 30 percent of the colonies’ resources. Districts received the other 70 per-
cent, on average, distributed as follows: 40 percent for administration expenses, 10 
percent for public works, 15 percent for education and health expenses (personal and 
material), and 5 percent for miscellaneous expenses. Investments in infrastructure, 
health, and education in the districts amounted to 25 percent of the colonies budg-
ets. All expenses in the colonies, and a fortiori in districts, were carried out by local 
budgets, except for some very large-scale public works projects (almost exclusively 
railway works) which were financed by federal resources.
C. public Goods Investment policy
Colonial administration invested in three public goods: education, health, and 
infrastructure. Every year French administrators had to define how many teachers, 
schools, doctors, and hospitals were needed and how much money was alloted for 
public works in determining the local budget. In the education field, administra-
tors had to decide how many European teachers, African teachers, and teaching 
assistants, as well as how many teaching materials were needed. In the medical field, 
they decided how many European doctors and nurses, African doctors and nurses, 
medical assistants were needed, and how many medical materials were needed. 
Finally, they decided how much financial resources were needed to cover their 
infrastructure expenses such as roads, wells, tracks, buildings, and bridge repair 
and  construction. A very precise “plan de campagne” was established annually to 
describe all the works to be performed in each locality.
Colonial investments in education, health, and infrastructure were not propor-
tional to district taxes. Taxes were actually brought together at the colony level, 
most of them were absorbed by central services and administration expenses, and 
the part of public expenses devoted to colonial investments was reallocated among 
districts with little concern for the initial contributions of each district. Some dis-
tricts contributed a lot in local budgets but received low investments, others con-
tributed a lot in local budgets and received high investments, and vice versa. As 
a consequence, the correlation between tax revenue and public investment was 
positive but small (about 0.2). No explicit investment strategy can be found in local 
budgets. Motivations reported at the beginning of each local budget explain the 
general level of annual resources and modifications in resource employment but 
do not motivate the spatial distribution of public goods provision. However, all his-
torical documents on the French colonial administrative system mention the rela-
tive autonomy of French district administrators and their power in terms of policy 
making (William B. Cohen 1973, Joseph Ki-Zerbo 1978, and Denise Bouche 
1991). Biographies of former French colonial administrators also give evidence on 
their initiating role in the investment decision process (Robert Delavignette 1939; 
Hubert Duchamps 1975). The influence of administrators on investment policy 
was certainly very high. Thus, their personality or educational background could 
be an exogenous source of differences in colonial public investments. But some 
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intrinsic characteristics of the districts certainly also influenced administrators’ 
investment policy and therefore constituted an issue for identifying the causal 
impact of colonial investments on current development. My empirical strategy 
tries to circumvent this potential problem.
II. Data and Summary Statistics
To estimate the impact of colonial investment in public goods on the develop-
ment of current districts, I use data on current development, colonial investment 
policy, and other pre-colonial characteristics as control variables. All data are at 
the district level, a district in French West Africa being an administrative unit 
within a colony. Figure 3 shows the district configuration that the paper refers 
to, which is the configuration in 1925. At this time, French West Africa included 
120 districts in 8 colonies. On average, districts had an area of 48,000 km2 and a 
population of 120,000.
I choose to use district-level rather than state-level data for two major reasons. 
First, using district-level data gives a larger sample size. Second, the French colonial 
system was, in fact, decentralized, and variations therefore arose at the district level 
rather than at the state level. District was thus the pertinent unit with respect to the 
historical effects focused on in this paper. The drawback is that no district-level data 
is available, so I had to compute current and historical data myself.
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Figure 3. Territorial Organization of French West Africa (1925)
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A. Current districts development
Although West Africa counts among the poorest regions of the world, there is an 
important heterogeneity between countries of this region. In 2000, the Gross National 
Product (GNP)  percapita for the Ivory Coast ($690) was four times higher than that 
of Niger ($190).4 In 1995, primary net enrollment rate varied from 25 percent in Niger 
to 75 percent in Benin.5 The literacy rate amounted to 13.5 percent in Niger, around 
20 percent in Mali and Burkina Faso, 32 percent in Senegal and Benin, 38 percent in 
Mauritania, and 44 percent in the Ivory Coast.6 The inequalities between countries 
are thus consequent. However, the greatest inequalities in former French West Africa 
do not arise at the state level, but at the district level.  District-level data on current 
development used in this paper come from national household surveys implemented 
in the 1990s.7 Unfortunately, I could not use any survey for Benin, which is there-
fore excluded from the sample. The number of available districts is therefore 101. 
Development indicators that can be computed from each national household survey 
are: (a) the proportion of 7–12-year-old children attending school, (b) the proportion 
of 0–5-year-old children suffering from stunting, and (c) the proportion of households 
connected to electricity, having access to a private water tap, and using a modern 
fuel.8 The Mauritanian survey does not contain information about the weight and the 
height of the children, so (b) excludes Mauritanian districts.
The top portion of Table 1 (labeled 1995 districts’ development) presents summary 
statistics on those five development indicators. On average, per district, in 1995, 34 
percent of the 7–12-year-old children attended school, 37 percent of 0–5-year-old 
children suffered from stunting, 12 percent of households were connected to electric-
ity, 10 percent had access to a private water tap (as opposed to public sources of water 
like fountains or natural sources like streams), and 14 percent used a modern fuel for 
cooking. Data give evidence of the very low development level of French-speaking 
West Africa. But the distributions of all these indicators are exceptionally unequal, 
particularly for infrastructure development indicators, as shown by the high values of 
standard errors and gaps between means and medians or between twenty-fifth and 
seventy-fifth percentiles.
Figure 4 represents the geographical distribution of districts by terciles of the 
proportion of 7–12-year-old children attending school. The districts of the first ter-
cile are light colored, those of the third tercile are dark colored. We can observe 
some regional tendencies (“light” areas versus “dark” areas), Northwest of West 
Africa and south of the vory Coast that are obviously more educated than the rest 
of the region. Spatial inequalities are therefore partly a matter of country and geo-
graphical location. Nevertheless, these maps also show an important heterogeneity 
between neighboring districts. To measure the importance of being in a particular 
country, I decomposed the total variance of each indicator in two parts: the vari-
4 Source: World Bank statistics. 
5 Source: World Bank statistics.
6 Source: World Bank statistics.
7 See Appendix 1 for further details on data. 
8 Surveys count, on average 450 households, 620 7–12-year-old children and 370 less than 5-year-old children 
per district.
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ance within countries and the variance between countries. I calculated the share of 
total variance due to variance within countries, and it clearly shows the predomi-
nance of  within-country variance which represents around 80 percent of total vari-
ance. Country or geographical position is a small part of the story. What we have to 
explain are inequalities at the district level rather than at the state level.
B. Colonial public Investments
Data on colonial investments come from annual local budgets for the period 
1910–1928. Local budgets are presented at the colony level but often detail tax rev-
enue and public investments at the district level. Regarding education, I collected the 
number of teachers per district for each available year between 1910 and 1928 and 
used the average number of teachers per 100,000 inhabitants as a proxy of colonial 
investments in education. I used the same variable for colonial investments in health 
substituting medical staff for teachers. Finally, I collected annual public works mate-
rial expenses per district between 1910 and 1928 and used the average amount of 
public works expenses from 1910–1928 per capita as a proxy of colonial invest-
ments in infrastructures.9 Public works consisted of roads, wells, tracks, building 
and bridge repairs and construction.
Data on large-scale public works projects financed with federal resources are 
not included for two reasons. First, it would have required the collection of federal 
budget data in addition to local budget data, which represents an important addi-
tional effort. Second, federal budgets do not decompose investments at the district 
level or at the state level, which would make any repartition between districts very 
hypothetical. This exclusion produces an understatement of colonial investments 
inequalities: large-scale public works financed with federal resources were mostly 
devoted to main towns or main axes of each colony; those that were already advan-
taged by local budgets. Actual colonial inequalities in infrastructures were probably 
larger than was measured here.
It is well known that Christian missionaries were important in the development 
of education and health systems in English African colonies as well as in French 
Equatorial Africa, but they were mainly absent from French West Africa (Ki-Zerbo 
1978 and Bouche 1991). In 1903, the French parliament actually voted the secu-
larization of social services in the colonies and stopped the subsidies accorded by 
French authorities to Christian missionaries. Archives do not mention the role of 
missions except in Dahomey,10 which is not included in my study. The omission of 
Christian missionaries in this paper should therefore not affect my results. In addi-
tion to Christian missionaries, there were also Koranic schools in some areas, but 
I will not take them into account because these schools dispensed a very specific 
education that focuses on religious achievement.
9 Another possible proxy of colonial investments in infrastructures could be the annual public works material 
expenses per district between 1910 and 1928 divided by land area. My results are robust whatever proxy is used. 
But dividing the amount of public works expenses by land area is more problematic in presence of desert-edge 
districts because land area is huge and effective land occupation is very low, resulting in a confusing proxy. 
10 Bouche (1991) explains that this colony had a significant number of missionary schools because the demand 
for education was far more important than the supply from public services in this colony. 
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As shown in the middle of Table 1 (labeled Colonial period), colonial invest-
ments per district were very low: 4 teachers and 8.5 medical workers per 100,000 
inhabitants and 0.44 FF11 per inhabitant for public works, on average, per year 
from 1910–1928. Standard deviations per mean unit are high and the difference in 
terciles’ means is huge. This gives evidence that colonial investments were very 
unequal. Figures 5 and 6 show the geographical distribution of colonial investment 
in education and health. It is clear that colonial investment policy was unbalanced. 
Upper Volta and the region southeast of Niger have been disadvantaged in terms of 
human capital investments. Investments in infrastructures were more concentrated 
in coastal areas of Senegal, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast, which reflects the structure 
of the French colonial economic system based on trade with European countries. In 
addition to regional discriminations, it is also noticeable that many neighbor districts 
received very different colonial treatments. The average gap between two neighbor 
districts is equal to five teachers and ten doctors, which is large compared to the 
average number of teachers and doctors per district.
Totalling average investments per district from 1910–1928 shows that there were, 
on average, only 700 teachers and 1,230 medical workers in all of French West 
Africa (of which a large majority were Africans). Thus, the colonial investment 
11 Monetary data are calculated in constant 1910 FF. 
Figure 4. Percent of 7–12-year-old Children Attending School
Note: Lowest tercile in light color, highest tercile in dark color.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics on Districts
Mean
Standard 
deviation
25th 
percentile Median
75th 
percentile Min Max Observations
1995 districts’ development
% of 7–12-year-old children attended 
school
34 16 22 33 43 1 75 98
% of 0–5-year-old children suffering 
from stunting
37 12 28 37 44 7 85 89
% of households connected to 
electricity
12 17 2 4 17 0 87 98
% of households having access to 
private water
10 13 1 5 14 0 72 98
% of households using a modern 
combustible
14 19 1 6 21 0 94 98
% of households living within 30mn 
from a primary school
67 15 57 69 78 32 92 52
% of households living within 30mn 
from a medical center
41 16 29 40 51 13 76 52
% of households living within 30mn 
from drinkable water
82 14 74 84 94 41 99 52
Colonial period
Number of teachers per 100,000 hbt 
from 1910–1928
4 5 1 3 4 0.2 28 99
Medical staff per 100,000 hbt from 
1910–1928
8.5 15 1 4.4 9 0 111 98
Public works expenses per capita 
from 1910–1928 (in 1910 FF)
0.44 1.2 0.05 0.13 0.31 0.003 9.7 99
New teachers per 100,000 hbt over 
1930–1939
4.6 6.7 1.2 2.7 5.2 –12.3 41.5 99
New schools per 100,000 hbt 
from1930–1939
1.7 2.4 0.3 1.4 2.5 –11 9.5 99
Local chiefs’ wages per 100,000 hbt 
from 1930–1939
92,319 113,797 28,827 46,931 97,021 0 582,889 99
Index of hostility toward colonial 
power from 1920–1940
0.42 0.41 0 0.33 0.66 0 2 99
Control variables
Number of European settlers per 
100,000 hbt in 1910
100 254 7.8 21 68 0 2,125 99
Colonial conquest
Year of colonial conquest’s 
beginning
1880 13.9 1879 1887 1890 1854 1903 99
Local resistance length 22.7 15.2 11 20 31 0 74 99
Local chiefs’ indemnities 657 1,516 0 0 420 0 7,726 99
Pre-colonial characteristics
Centralized political power 
dummy
0.49 0.5 0 0 1 0 1 99
1910 population density 6.22 7.15 1.72 3.8 7.9 0.008 38 99
Trade taxes per capita collected 
in 1914
0.23 0.38 0.004 0.04 0.31 0 1.81 99
Europoean trade counter dummy 0.04 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 99
Geographical characteristics
Altitude (feet) 816 594 242 859 1,161 0 3,044 99
Annual rainfall average over 
1915–1975 (mm)
1,050 718 500 890 1,546 17 3,248 99
Latitude 12.3 3.6 9.6 12.8 14.8 4.8 21 99
Longitude –6.7 6.8 –12.1 –7.3 –3.35 –17.1 12.9 99
Coastal dummy 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 0 1 99
Presence of an important river 
dummy
0.65 0.48 0 1 1 0 1 99
Notes: See Appendix 1 for data description and sources. Statistics are all calculated at the district level. Saint-Louis and Dakar 
are excluded from the sample. Data on 1995 current development is missing for Bilma. Data on percent 0–5-year-old children suf-
fering from stunting is missing for Mauritanian districts. Data on medical staff per 100,000 people is missing for Conakry.
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effort was not massive. But these investments were unequally distributed. Colonial 
public investments’ policy was therefore an important source of inequality between 
districts.
C. other Characteristics of districts
At the end of the nineteenth century, French West Africa was a vast territory of 
4,800,000 km2 inhabited by a scarce population of around 12,000,000 people.12 
Population density was very low (2.5 people per km2 ). As stated in the introduction, 
an advantage of limiting the study to a geographically restricted area is that sources 
of variation can be much more easily identified than in the case of very different his-
torical, anthropological, geographical, and institutional backgrounds. This section 
identifies characteristics of districts that potentially determined colonial investments 
and development performances. I collected a fair amount of observable characteris-
tics of the districts. All data are original.
12 This corresponds to French West Africa’s population around 1910. See Appendix 1 for further details on 
data sources. 
Figure 5. Number of Teachers per 100,000 Inhabitants  
(Annual mean, 1910–1928)
Note: Bottom tercile in light color, top tercile in dark color.
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Geographical Characteristics.—Geographical characteristics of districts are 
potentially important determinants of their development path. They condition soil 
fertility, climate severity or mildness, accessibility to water, etc. (David E. Bloom 
and Jeffrey D. Sachs 1998). Climate, proximity to the coast, or access to practicable 
rivers could also have influenced colonial investments through their impact on the 
accessibility and  attractiveness of districts. I use geographical characteristics reflect-
ing the accessibility and attractiveness of districts as control variables. These char-
acteristics are altitude, annual precipitation, latitude, longitude, presence of a coastal 
border, and presence of an important river.
pre-colonial history.—We could expect Europeans to prefer pre-colonial pros-
perous areas. The colonial strategy was actually extraction. Profitability of extrac-
tion was likely to be higher in prosperous areas because dense population provided a 
supply of labor that could be forced to work in plantations and public works and also 
because there are more resources to be extracted (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2002). Philip Curtin et al. (1995, 447) write that “European capital was invested 
where exploitable resources promised the most extractive returns.”  District-level 
information on pre-colonial times is difficult to collect, but I constructed four 
proxies of characteristics of pre-colonial districts. First, I capture the pre-colonial 
Figure 6. Medical Staff per 100,000 Inhabitants  
(Annual mean, 1910–1928)
Note: Bottom tercile in light color, top tercile in dark color.
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 economic prosperity with the initial population density. As documented by Thomas 
Malthus (1798) and Bairoch (1993), only prosperous areas could support high popu-
lation densities because more natural resources and agrarian prosperity are neces-
sary to nourish a large population. This measure is therefore more appropriate in the 
case of rural societies. At the end of the nineteenth century, West Africa was mostly 
a rural area. Towns were scarce and very small.13 Pre-colonial population density 
was concentrated in five places: on the right side of the Niger Loop (Mossi States), 
on Senegalese coastal areas (Djolof kingdoms), in central Guinea (Fuuta-Jalon), in 
south-central Ivory Coast (Baoule people), and in the Guinean forest area (Toma 
and Guerze people). Second, I use the amount of trading tax collected in 1914 in 
each district to control for commercial development. Trading tax was introduced 
a few years before 1914 and regarded all secondary and tertiary activities. Tariffs 
depended on firms’ activity and number of employees. Third, besides these local 
trade activities, there were some very important overseas trade areas, European trad-
ing counters. These trading counters had created big discontinuities in West-African 
economic development. That is why I constructed a dummy variable indicating the 
location of these European trade counters. Fourth, I roughly capture the differences 
in pre-colonial political development with a dummy for pre-colonial centralized 
political power (“state societies”) as opposed to stateless societies. The existence of 
a centralized political power could have encouraged colonial investments according 
to the fact that investments could be more profitable in state rather than stateless 
districts, as shown by Nicola Geneaioli and Ilia Rainer (2003).
French Conquest Characteristics.—Colonial conquest could reveal some intrin-
sic characteristics of disticts which make them more or less attractive for French 
power and more or less inclined to develop. I therefore use three variables on colo-
nial conquest as control variables. First, the first year of the French colonial con-
quest, defined as the year of arrival of the first military troops. Fifty years passed 
between the beginning and the end of French colonial expansion in West Africa, 
which makes a big difference when compared to the length of the colonial era itself. 
Colonialism’s timing might be correlated with both colonial investments (early con-
quered districts could have an advantaged over districts conquered later, or may 
be disadvantaged since colonization was extractive) and development potentialities 
(more affluent areas could have been colonized sooner). Second, I use African peo-
ple’s resistance against French colonial power as a control variable because it might 
be correlated with colonial investments (rewards or punishments in response to local 
attitudes) and development potentialities because resistance might reflect some cul-
tural, anthropological, or political characteristics. Third, I use the indemnities of 
local chiefs as a control variable because these indemnities rewarded chiefs for their 
obedience to colonial power. Chiefs’ indemnities are thus a proxy for African chiefs’ 
reaction. Some refused to cooperate and were often killed or exiled, whereas others 
cooperated with French colonial power and received some indemnities. As African 
13 In 1910, the five biggest towns were Saint-Louis (around 24,000 inhabitants), Dakar (18,400), Rufisque 
(12,500), Conakry (8,200), and Cotonou (4,400). These towns were much smaller at the end of the pre-colonial era.
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people resisted, collaboration between traditional and colonial power might be cor-
related with colonial investments and development potentialities.
Early European settlement.—According to existing literature, European settle-
ment encouraged good colonial treatment (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). 
In West Africa, very few Europeans settled in comparison to other colonies such as 
Australia, Canada, etc. Early French settlement can reflect districts initial attractive-
ness, however. Since it was probably a strong determinant of colonial investments, 
the impact of colonial investments on current performances could be driven by the 
fact that European settlers tended to settle in more prosperous areas. Moreover, 
European settlement, per se, could positively influence development paths through 
institutional channels, as documented in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). 
Faced with the statistical challenge of isolating the causal impact of public invest-
ments, controlling for European settlement is of crucial concern. The flip side of 
this strategy is that European settlement could also be endogenous to colonial public 
investments: the supply of public goods might be attractive for new settlers as well. 
To solve this problem, I add only early European settlement (1910) as a control vari-
able, since early European settlers were more likely to be influenced by the charac-
teristics of districts compared to colonial supply of public goods simply because the 
supply of public goods was almost nonexistent at the beginning of colonial times. 
The year 1910 is early enough to argue that European settlement was unlikely to be 
the result of any colonial policy.
III. Basic Correlations: OLS Estimates
A. Empirical strategy
I compare districts’ development performances according to the colonial invest-
ments they received between 1910 and 1928 by running ordinary least squares 
regressions of the form
(1) yi = α + βCIi + OCIi  γ + Xi λ + u i,
where yi is an outcome variable in district i, CIi is the colonial investment of inter-
est in district i, oCIi is other colonial investments in district i, and Xi is a control 
variable.
Outcomes in equation (1) are those presented in Section II: the proportion of 
7–12-year-old children attending school; the proportion of 0–5-year-old children 
suffering from stunting; and the proportion of households connected to electricity, 
having access to a private water tap, and using a modern fuel.
Regarding colonial investments, what interests me more specifically is the impact 
of colonial investments in education on educational performance, the impact of colo-
nial investments in health on health performance, and the impact of colonial invest-
ments in infrastructure on infrastructure development. As colonial investments in 
education, health, and infrastructure are highly correlated, I want to disentangle 
the effect of each investment. I measure the specific impact of a given colonial 
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investment (CIi in equation (1)) on the related current performance (yi in equation (1)) by controlling for the other colonial investments (vector OCIi in equation (1)). 
When yi is districts’ proportion of 7–12-year-old children attending school, CIi is 
districts’ average annual number of teachers per 100,000 capita, and vector OCIi 
is districts’ average annual medical staff per 100,000 capita and average annual 
amount of public works per capita. When yi is districts’ proportion of 0–5-year-old 
children suffering from stunting, CIi is districts’ average annual medical staff per 
100,000 capita; and when yi is one of the three infrastructure development indica-
tors, CIi is districts’ average annual amount of public works per capita, vector OCIi 
being the two other colonial investments. Since districts that received many teachers 
received many doctors and a lot of infrastructure (correlations between these three 
variables are between 0.60 and 0.80), the impact of colonial investments is likely to 
be driven by the general amount of investments rather than by a specific investment. 
Controlling for the two other colonial investments in equation (1), it is interesting to 
isolate the specific impact of each kind of investment, and it also brings an additional 
control for the potentially unobserved characteristics that influenced all investments 
in the same way. It helps to identify the causal impact of a specific investment on the 
corresponding current outcome.
Xi is the set of control variables described in Section III: geographical variables (precipitation, altitude, latitude, longitude, coastal border dummy, and practicable river 
dummy), pre-colonial prosperity (centralized political power dummy, 1910 population 
density, 1914 collected trade taxes per capita, and European trade counter dummy), 
conquest variables (year of colonial conquest’s beginning, length of local resistance, 
and local chiefs’ indemnities), and early European settlement (1910 European settlers 
per 100,000 inhabitants). I argue that these controls are more precise and demanding 
than usual, and that they purge a large number of the endogenous factors.
Dakar and Saint-Louis had a very specific status during the colonial period. They 
were both founded by the Europeans. Saint-Louis was the first city founded by the 
Europeans in West Africa in 1659, it was the capital of French West Africa until 1902, 
and then the capital of two colonies (Mauritania and Senegal). Dakar has been the 
capital of French West Africa since 1902. These two cities were not exactly “districts” 
because they were not attached to a broader region. As a consequence, Dakar and 
Saint-Louis did not appear in colonial budgets as districts but as “direct adminis-
trated territories.” As far as public investments are concerned, Dakar and Saint-Louis 
received much greater annual colonial investments than the classical districts: 63 
(respectively 202) teachers per 100,000 inhabitants, 133 (respectively 241) medical 
workers per 100,000 inhabitants, and 12.1 (respectively 21.6) FF per capita in public 
works for Dakar (respectively Saint-Louis), on average, from 1910–1928. They are also 
much more developed today than the rest of the region. The colonial investments gap 
between those two cities and the others would produce an important overstatement of 
the impact of colonial investments on current performances and would probably reflect 
the very specific colonial treatment they received. I therefore prefer to drop Dakar and 
Saint-Louis from the sample.
Our coefficient of interest is β, and to a lesser extent γ, because it is also interest-
ing to know whether there are “cross effects,” for example, effects of colonial invest-
ments in education on current health and infrastructure performances.
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B. results
Table 2 and Table 3 report OLS estimates of the impact of 1910–1928 colonial 
investments on 1995 performances. Column 2 includes geographical controls, 
 column 3 adds pre-colonial characteristics, column 4 adds conquest characteristics, 
and column 5 adds European settlement in 1910 as control variables. In column 6, 
I add dummy variables that indicate the country districts’ location after independ-
ence. These are included because the dependent variables are taken from country 
surveys that may be constructed using different methodologies. Finally, column 7 
reports the regression coefficients controlling for the other colonial investments to 
isolate the specific impact of each type of investments.
Table 2—The Impact of Colonial Investments on 1995 Education and Health: OLS Estimates
Coefficient on colonial 
investments (annual mean 
over 1910–1928)
No controls
Geographical 
controls
Pre-colonial 
controls
Conquest 
controls
Attractiveness 
controls
Country fixed 
effects
Other
investments 
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
panel A: percent 7–12-year-old children attending school as dependent variable
Number of teachers per 1.66*** 1.28*** 1.16*** 0.93*** 1.14** 0.79* 0.95*
 100,000 hbt (0.26) (0.31) (0.36) (0.35) (0.48) (0.45) (0.52)
Medical staff per 0.07
 100,000 hbt (0.22)
Public works expenses per 3.18
 1 hbt (3.23)
r2 0.30 0.41 0.42 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 97
panel B: percent 0–5-year-old children suffering from stunting as dependent variable
Number of teachers per 0.47
 100,000 hbt (0.46)
Medical staff per –0.43*** –0.60*** –0.59*** –0.60*** –0.56*** –0.49** –0.56***
 100,000 hbt (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Public works expenses –3.55
 per 1 hbt (5.85)
r2 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.41 0.37
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Control variables
Geographical 
 characteristics
N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pre-colonial 
 characteristics
N N Y Y Y Y Y
Colonial conquest N N N Y Y Y Y
Initial attractiveness N N N N Y Y Y
Country fixed effects N N N N N Y N
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each cell represents the coefficient from an OLS regression of the dependent vari-
able on the independent variable. In panel A, column 8, the number of observations falls to 97 because data on medical staff 
per 100,000 hbt is missing for Conakry district. In panel B, the number of observations falls to 88 because data on medical staff 
per 100,000 hbt is missing for Conakry district and data on percent 0–5-year-old children suffering from stunting is missing for 
Mauritanian districts. Initial attractiveness control variables are: number of European Settlers per 100,000 population in 1910 
and trade taxes per capita collected in 1914. Colonial conquest control variables are: year of colonial conquest’s beginning, local 
resistance length, local resistance length2, and local chiefs’ indemnities. Pre-colonial characteristics control variables are: cen-
tralized political power dummy, European trade counter dummy, and 1910 population density. Geographical characteristics con-
trol variables are: annual rainfall average from 1915–1975, altitude, longitude, latitude, coastal dummy, and river dummy.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The general picture that emerges from these tables is that districts that received more 
investments from 1910–1928 have significantly better performances today. The size of 
the impact of colonial investments is important. Adding one teacher per 100,000 inhab-
itants from 1910–1928 would lead the percentage of 7–12-year-old children attending 
school in 1995 up to about 1 point. Adding one doctor per 100,000 inhabitants from 
1910–1928 would drop the percentage of 0–5-year-old children suffering from stunt-
ing in 1995 to about 0.5 points. Finally, adding one franc per capita public works from 
Table 3—The Impact of Colonial Investments on 1995 Access to Infrastructures: OLS Estimates
Coefficient on colonial 
 investments (annual mean 
 over 1910–1928)
No controls Geographical 
controls
Pre-colonial 
controls
Conquest 
controls
Attractiveness 
controls
Country 
fixed
effects
Other
investment
controls(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
panel A: percent households connected to electricity as dependent variable
Number of teachers per 0.01
 100,000 hbt (0.40)
Medical staff per 100,000 hbt 0.12
(0.18)
Public works expenses 8.71*** 6.96*** 9.05*** 8.69*** 5.29*** 5.72*** 1.16
 per 1 hbt (1.1) (1.11) (1.36) (1.29) (1.43) (1.39) (2.50)
r2 0.38 0.58 0.61 0.67 0.73 0.78 0.70
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 97
panel B: percent households having access to private water as dependent variable
Number of teachers per 0.05
 100,000 hbt (0.43)
Medical staff per 100,000 hbt –0.03
(0.19)
Public works expenses 6.11*** 5.62*** 6.92*** 6.80*** 5.74*** 5.82*** 3.11*
 per 1 hbt (0.92) (1.00) (1.25) (1.27) (1.52) (1.54) (1.85)
r2 0.31 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.54 0.50
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 97
panel C: percent households using a modern fuel as dependent variable
Number of teachers per 0.50
 100,000 hbt (0.45)
Medical staff per 100,000 hbt –0.005
(0.20)
Public works expenses 8.81*** 6.75*** 9.88*** 9.58*** 7.49*** 7.70*** 3.14
 per 1 hbt (1.37) (1.35) (1.63) (1.36) (1.60) (1.55) (2.81)
r2 0.30 0.51 0.56 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.72
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 97
Control variables
Geographical characteristics N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pre-colonial characteristics N N Y Y Y Y Y
Colonial conquest N N N Y Y Y Y
Initial attractiveness N N N N Y Y Y
Country fixed effects N N N N N Y N
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each cell represents the coefficient from an OLS regression of the dependent variable 
on the independent variable. In column 7, the number of observations falls to 97 because data on medical staff per 100,000 hbt is 
missing for Conakry district. Initial attractiveness control variables are: number of European settlers per 100,000 population in 
1910, and trade taxes per capita collected in 1914. Colonial conquest control variables are: year of colonial conquest’s beginning, 
local resistance length, local resistance length2, and local chiefs’ indemnities. Pre-colonial characteristics control variables are: 
centralized political power dummy, European trade counter dummy, and 1910 population density. Geographical characteristics 
control variables are: annual rainfall average 1915–1975, altitude, longitude, latitude, coastal dummy, and river dummy.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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1910–1928 would the percentages of households having access to a private water tap and 
using a modern fuel to raise to about 3 points. But the specific impact of the investments 
in infrastructures appears statistically unconvincing since the coefficient is not signifi-
cant in column 7, except in panel B. Table 2 clearly shows that colonial investments in 
health and infrastructures did not have an impact on current school attendance, per se, 
and that colonial investments in education and in infrastructures did not have an impact 
on current health performances, per se. These findings highlight the specific impact of 
colonial investments in education on educational performance and the specific impact 
of colonial investments in health on health performance, which gives strong evidence 
that the nature of public investments matters even in the long run. This is also an impor-
tant point with regard to identification of the causal impact of public investments. The 
fact that “cross-investment” effects are very small compared to  “direct-investment” 
effects is very interesting because it confirms that I correctly identify the causal impact 
of a specific investment rather than other correlated factors.
We can notice that the explanatory variables in this paper account for about 40 
percent of the variation in 1995 health performances, 50 percent of the variation in 
1995 school attendance, and 70 percent of the variation in 1995 access to infrastruc-
tures. More importantly, each specific colonial investment alone accounts for about 
30 percent of the variation in the corresponding 1995 performance.
IV. Econometric Issues: Selection and Causality
Although the OLS estimates show that differences in colonial investments prob-
ably caused differences in current performances, thanks to precise and demanding 
controls, it remains plausible that control variables included in previous specifica-
tions do not capture all factors correlated with colonial investments and current out-
comes. In this section, I pursue two strategies to evaluate whether the relationship 
between colonial investments and current performances might reflect omitted vari-
ables. First, using historic data and qualitative evidence from African historians, I 
evaluate the importance and characteristics of selection into colonial investments. 
As I will show, evidence suggests that selection was not important. If any, it was 
usually the regions that were the least prosperous that selected into colonial invest-
ments. Given this evidence, it is unlikely that the strong relationship between colo-
nial investments and current performance is driven by selection. Second, I use a 
“natural experiment” approach that compares neighbor districts only. Results from 
this matching strategy confirm the OLS estimates.
A. historical Evidence on selection during Colonial Times
Using data on initial population densities (1910), I check whether it was the 
more prosperous or less prosperous areas that selected into colonial investments. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) have shown that population density is a 
reasonable indicator of economic prosperity, following Malthus and Bairoch’s argu-
ments. Table 4 shows the relationship between population density in 1910 and colo-
nial investments in education (health, infrastructures, respectively). The data give 
evidence that the colonial supply of public goods was equal in the most and least 
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prosperous areas. With respect to education and health, the advantage even turned 
slightly in favor of least prosperous areas, probably due to the fact that public goods 
are lumpy fixed investments. In this case, the selection, if any, tends to bias the OLS 
estimates toward zero.
A second potential source of selection may be that politically well-structured soci-
eties have selected into colonial investments. Pre-colonial kingdoms were politically 
unified and therefore benefited from a greater social cohesion. As a consequence, 
they were more likely to claim a larger share of the new public goods than decentral-
ized and heterogeneous societies (Banerjee, Iyer, and Rohini Somanathan 2008). But 
data give evidence that districts located in pre-colonial kingdoms were less impacted 
by colonial investments than the others. In the period 1910–1928, the average annual 
number of teachers per 100,000 inhabitants was 3.5 compared to 5.2, the average 
annual number of doctors per 100,000 inhabitants was 6.3 compared to 10.6, and 
the average annual expenses in public works was 0.24 compared to 0.64 (all of these 
differences are significant at the 5 percent level). The general picture that emerges 
from the data is that the selection bias is, again, rather downward.
One could think that colonial investments were actually determined by some 
characteristics related to European suitability rather than pre-colonial development. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) document the fact that European settle-
ment was, for instance, influenced by the disease environment, which is somehow 
disconnected from local prosperity. Such an exogenous source of variation in colo-
nial investments within French West Africa could be the distance from the coast. The 
distance from the coast was a physical determinant for European settlement since 
Europeans arrived by boats and were more likely to settle in areas near the coast. 
If colonial supply of public goods followed European settlement (because European 
demand for schools, hospitals, and infrastructure was high), we would expect colo-
nial investments to be correlated negatively to the distance from the coast. Table 4 
shows the correlation between colonial investments in education, health, and infra-
structure, and distance from the coast. The correlation is significantly negative (or 
nil in the case of investments in health), which confirms that something accidental 
Table 4—Historical Evidence on Selection During Colonial Times
Dependent variable: colonial investments (annual mean 1910–1928)
Number of 
teachers per 
100,000 hbt
Medical staff 
per 
100,000 hbt
Public works 
expenses
per 1 hbt
Number of 
teachers per 
100,000 hbt
Medical staff
per
100,000 hbt
Public works
expenses
per 1 hbt
Coefficient on: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population density 1910 –0.13** –0.27 –0.006
(0.07) (0.20) (0.017)
Distance from the –0.004*** –0.005 –0.0009***
 coast (km) (0.0001) (0.004) (0.0003)
r2 0.03 0.02 0.001 0.08 0.02 0.09
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each cell represents the coefficient from an OLS regression of the dependent variable 
on the independent variable.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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influenced overall colonial investment patterns. But the correlation does not explain 
much of the variation in colonial investments (8 percent, 2 percent, and 9 percent, 
respectively). In particular, test for weak instrument shows that distance from the 
coast is not a valid instrument.
To conclude, the variation in the characteristics of districts leaves much of the 
observed variation in colonial investments unexplained (the share of variation attribut-
able to population density and pre-colonial political status together is only 4 percent, 
and the share attributable to distance from the coast does not exceed 9 percent). If 
local characteristics were only weak determinants of colonial investments, then the 
decisive factor is to be found elsewhere. On this point, Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan 
(2006) highlight the role of “top-down interventions” in bringing about changes in 
public goods access. Based on historical literature on colonial French West Africa, 
“top-down interventions” seem to be an appropriate explanation of the observed vari-
ations in colonial investments for several reasons. First, district administrators were 
largely autonomous as explained in Section I. All testimony from former administra-
tors attests to the fact that they controlled every aspect of district management and 
drew their own policy (William B. Cohen 1973, Delavignette 1939, Association des 
anciens élèves de l’école coloniale 1998, and Colombani 1991). Second, there was a 
large heterogeneity among administrators. Cohen (1973) reports five types of adminis-
trators: former soldiers (apparently the most brutal and violent with local populations), 
former metropolitan civil servants (inappropriate for colonial service), former gover-
nor secretaries (good for administrative work but not for management), former admin-
istrators’ assistants (not well educated but well informed on administrator’s work), and 
former pupils of French “Ecole Coloniale” (well educated, part of the French elite). 
Third, Cohen (1973), among others, emphasizes the relationship between the adminis-
trators’ educational and familial backgrounds and their vision of colonization (more or 
less humanist). The specific personality of the administrators was, therefore, a strong 
determinant of the policy they implemented, particularly at the beginning of colonial 
times (in the 1900s and 1910s), because administrators stayed long enough in specific 
districts to implement long-term projects (after World War I, they had relatively shorter 
tenures, typically three years). According to historians, the intervention of the admin-
istrators accounts for a significant part of the design of public goods policy. Since the 
affectation of an administrator in a specific district was a matter of vacancy and not a 
matter a selection (Cohen 1973, 76), the variation in the “quality” of the administrators 
constitutes an exogenous source of variation in public goods policy.14
B. matching Estimates
The strategy that I pursue is to use a matching approach that consists of compar-
ing neighbor districts. This strategy exploits the spatial discontinuities of investment 
policy. The underlying idea is that geographic neighbors had similar unobservable 
14 I do not use the identity of the administrators as an instrument because of the lack of data. Such data prob-
ably exists, but I do not know exactly where (probably in Dakar) or what can be found on administrators’ char-
acteristics. It is not certain that those characteristics that influenced the supply of public goods were observed by 
the French administration.
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characteristics before being separated by a border under colonial rule. Differences 
in neighbors’ outcomes are, then, unlikely to be due to differences in omitted vari-
ables. This approach is very close to a matching approach. In the case of French 
West Africa, there are good reasons to think that neighboring districts were very 
similar before colonial times. District borders did not exist in the pre-colonial 
era and were created at the beginning of French colonial rule. Most are natural 
borders (rivers), some are simply straight lines between two points. The aim of 
colonial power was to build districts that represented a similar charge for French 
administrators, either in terms of population or in terms of area. Colonial annual 
political reports give evidence that the definition of district borders was often a 
matter of administrative charges rather than a matter of intrinsic characteristics. 
Colonial power also divided some communities in order to have greater control 
of them. District administrators’ annual reports relate many cases of unrest at the 
borders due to the fact that people continued to ignore the borders and went here 
and there without worrying about colonial administrative rules. Pre-colonial and 
colonial maps show that the borders of pre-colonial kingdoms have been ignored, 
as have ethnic differences. This fact is obvious on colonial district maps. These 
maps indicate the ethnic groups present in each district, and we can see that an 
ethnic group was often present on both sides of a border. District borders are thus 
somewhat arbitrary.
This leads me to assume that neighbor districts shared similar unobservable char-
acteristics. This assumption can be interpreted as the fact that unobservable char-
acteristics are geographically distributed and that district borders were sufficiently 
exogenous to make differences between neighbor districts’ unobservable character-
istics not salient. I suppose that current outcomes of district i belonging to neighbor-
hood j can be written as a linear function of its colonial investments CIi and OCIi, 
its intrinsic characteristics Xi, and a neighborhood fixed effect θj:
(2) yi = α + βCIi + OCIi γ + Xi λ + θj + ui.
The only difference between equations (1) and (2) is the presence of a neighbor-
hood fixed effect in equation (2), representing the fact that districts in the same 
neighborhood share common unobservable characteristics.
The outcome differential between two districts i and i’, belonging to the same 
neighborhood j, can be written as
(3)  yi − yi’ = β(CIi − CIi’) + (OCIi − OCIi’) γ + (Xi − Xi’)λ + ui − ui’ .
Parameter β can be estimated by running an OLS regression of districts, of the 
same neighborhood outcomes differential, on the corresponding colonial invest-
ments differential. These regressions allow me to check that my first results from 
equation (1) were not driven by omitted variables. Since district i can appear several 
times in the differentials within a neighborhood, standard errors within neighbor-
hoods are not independent. Standard errors are thus adjusted for clustering at the 
neighborhood level.
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An intuitive definition of neighbor districts would be “districts that share a com-
mon border” (Banerjee and Iyer 2005 use this definition with a similar empirical 
context to mine). But the problem with this naïve definition is that neighborhoods 
overlap (see more explanations in Appendix 2). In order to circumvent this prob-
lem, I need a definition of neighbor districts that create disjointed neighborhoods. I 
define a neighborhood as a cluster of three districts that share a common border and 
assume that neighborhood fixed effect is similar within, but not between, clusters. 
This leads to divide district maps into disjointed neighborhoods which are sets of 
three districts sharing a common border. Appendix 2 gives further details on match-
ing procedure.15
Table 5 shows the matching estimates of the impact of colonial investments on 
current performances. They are close to OLS estimates (slightly smaller but not 
significantly different) which indicates that naïve estimates possibly were biased 
upward but not driven by unobservable characteristics shared by neighbor districts. 
The fact that matching estimates are a little smaller than OLS estimates can also 
reflect externalities between neighbor districts. The treatment could affect the con-
trol group because neighbor districts might benefit from investments in neighboring 
areas. In this case, matching estimates are downwardly biased. These regressions 
also indicate that observed geographical, pre-colonial, and colonial characteristics 
explain between 50 percent and 80 percent of the differences in current performance 
between neighbor districts.
In the end, we may think that the long-term impact of early colonial investment 
is too large to be due only to the early colonial investments themselves. Since these 
results do not take into account what happened later, they may reflect the relation-
ship between early colonial investments and something caused by them. We there-
fore need to explore what happened in the interval.
V. Why Do Early Colonial Public Investments Still Matter?
Previous results establish large and robust differences in current performances due 
to differences in colonial public investments. Why are long-term returns to invest-
ments so large? In this section, I present some potential answers to this question.
One reason why early investments had large long-term returns is that more 
schools, dispensaries, and infrastructures continued to be built in places that already 
had many of them at the beginning of the colonial period. I consider the average 
annual number of teachers over two periods: 1910–1928 (period 1) and 1930–1939 
(period 2). The top panel of Figure 7 shows that districts that received more teachers 
15 Banerjee and Iyer (2005) also use the fact that neighbor districts share similar unobservable characteristics. 
They derive a different empirical strategy using a subsample of neighbor districts to check if OLS results are 
driven by omitted variables. They argue that restricting the sample to those districts, that happen to be geographi-
cal neighbors with a different colonial treatment, adds controls for possible omitted variables. But in the case 
of a continuous treatment (like colonial investments), using a subsample of neighbor districts is not sufficient to 
control for omitted variables. In the presence of a “low-middle peer” (one district receiving a “low” treatment 
and its neighbor a “middle” treatment) and a “middle-high peer” (one district receiving a “middle” treatment 
and its neighbor a “high” treatment), results might be driven by the difference between the low-treated and the 
 high-treated districts which might not be neighbors. Thus, bias due to omitted variables is not corrected. That is 
why I chose to follow a matching approach rather than the Banerjee and Iyer (2005) subsample approach.
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during the first period continued to receive more new teachers in the second period. 
The correlation between the number of teachers in period 1 and period 2 is 0.87, 
even if the number of teachers jumped from 3 per district, on average, in period 1, 
to 9 per district, on average, in period 2. To take into account the variations in popu-
lation size, in the bottom panel of Figure 7, I also plot the number of new teachers 
per 100,000 inhabitants from 1930–1939 along the distribution of the number of 
teachers per 100,000 inhabitants from 1910–1928. The correlation is a little lower 
(0.72) because few, if any, new teachers were posted in sparsely populated districts 
(desert-edge areas), that had many teachers per population unit from 1910–1928 due 
to the fact that teachers are lumpy fixed investments. One district, Tabou, lost two 
teachers between period 1 and period 2, which was not so much in absolute terms 
but produced a big loss compared to its sparse population (this district appears as 
an outlier in the bottom panel of  Figure 7). Nevertheless, the number of teachers 
per population unit from 1910–1928 is a positive and significant determinant to the 
number of new teachers per population unit from 1930–1939, as shown in Table 6, 
Table 5—The Impact of Colonial Investments on Current Performances: Matching Estimates
Dependent variables
Difference in 
school 
attendance rate
Difference in 
stunting rate
Difference in % of 
households connected 
to electricity
Difference in % of 
households having 
access to water
Difference in % of 
households using a 
modern fuel
Coefficient on (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
difference in colonial investments
Number of teachers 0.57* 0.78** 0.22 0.02 0.68
per 100,000 hbt over 
1910–1928
(0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.19) (0.52)
Medical staff per –0.01 –0.52*** 0.40*** 0.15** 0.17
100,000 hbt over 
1910–1928
(0.17) (0.17) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12)
Public works expenses 0.88 –1.93 0.75 2.5* 3.1**
per capita over 
1910–1928
(2.4) (1.79) (1.44) (1.3) (1.6)
Control variables
Difference in the number of European settlers per 100,000 hbt in 1910.
Difference in colonial conquest variables: year of colonial conquest’s beginning, length of local resistance to colonial conquest, 
and local chiefs’ indemnities.
Difference in pre-colonial characteristics: centralized political power dummy, 1910 population density, trade taxes collected in 
1914, and former European trade counter dummy.
Difference in geographical characteristics: altitude, latitude, longitude, annual rainfall, coastal dummy, and river dummy.
Observations 71 62 71 71 71
Neighborhoods 30 27 30 30 30
r2 0.49 0.64 0.65 0.81 0.66
Notes: Dependent and independent variables are the value differences between neighbor districts of the same neighborhood. 
Results come from 50 OLS regressions of the dependent variable on the independent variables using 50 random neighborhood 
designs. Reported coefficient is the mean of the 50 coefficients of the dependent variable on the independent variable. Standard 
deviation in parentheses equals (50/49) × the empirical standard deviation of the 50 coefficients of the dependent variable on 
the independent variable. Number of observations is the mean of the 50 numbers of observations (neighbor districts differences) 
resulting from the 50 neighborhood designs. Number of neighborhoods is the mean of the 50 numbers of neighborhoods resulting 
from the 50 neighborhood designs. r2 is the mean of the 50 r2 from the 50 OLS regressions. Data on stunting children are miss-
ing for the Mauritanian districts. Data on medical staff per 100,000 hbt are missing for Conakry district.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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columns 1 and 2. This result is robust to the inclusion of my usual control variables, 
as shown in column 3. Thus, early investments attracted later investments, at least 
during the colonial period.
I do not have the evidence on investments between 1940 and 1995 (or only on 
small samples), so I do not know how things evolved in the interval. But some of 
the 1995 national household surveys give evidence on distance to public goods. For 
Figure 7. The Relation between Later and Former Investments
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Table 6—What Explains That More Teachers Continued to Be Posted in Areas  
That Had Many of Them Already?
Dependent variable: New teachers per 100,000 from 1930–1939
Coefficient on: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Teachers per 100,000 hbt 0.47*** 0.63*** 0.47*** 0.92*** 0.87*** 0.55*** 0.67***
 from 1910–1928 (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.21) (0.24) (0.09) (0.13)
Medical staff per 100,000 hbt –0.15*** –0.14*
 from 1910–1928 (0.05) (0.074)
Public works exp. per 1 hbt –0.07 –0.07
 from 1910–1928 (1.12) (1.26)
New schools per 100,000 hbt 1.66*** 1.99***
 from 1930–1939 (0.22) (0.27)
Local chiefs’ wages per 100,000 hbt
 from 1930–1939
Hostility toward colonial power
 from 1920–1940
r2 0.15 0.25 0.39 0.26 0.38 0.53 0.64
Observations 99 98 98 97 97 98 98
Tabou in the sample Y N N N N N N
Control variables
Geographical characteristics N N Y N Y N Y
Pre-colonial characteristics N N Y N Y N Y
Colonial conquest N N Y N Y N Y
Initial attractiveness N N Y N Y N Y
Country fixed effects N N Y N Y N Y
Dependent variable: New teachers per 100,000 from 1930–1939
Coefficient on: (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Teachers per 100,000 hbt  
 from 1910–1928
0.62*** 0.47*** 0.58*** 0.53*** 1.02***
(0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16)
Medical staff per 100,000 hbt –1.86**
 from 1910–1928 (0.9)
Public works exp. per 1 hbt –0.0001
 from 1910–1928 (0.0001)
New schools per 100,000 hbt 0.83
 from 1930–1939 (1.17)
Local chiefs’ wages per 100,000 hbt 0.0001 0.0001 –0.13***
 from 1930–1939 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.046)
Hostility toward colonial power 3.65*** 3.86*** 1.77***
 from 1920–1940 (1.40) (1.69) (0.24)
r2 0.27 0.41 0.29 0.43 0.66
Observations 98 98 98 98 97
Tabou in the sample N N N N N
Control variables
Geographical characteristics N Y N Y Y
Pre-colonial characteristics N Y N Y Y
Colonial conquest N Y N Y Y
Initial attractiveness N Y N Y Y
Country fixed effects N Y N Y Y
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each cell represents the coefficient from an OLS regression of the dependent vari-
able on the independent variable. In columns 6, 7, and 12, the number of observations falls to 97 because data on medical staff 
per 100,000 hbt are missing for Conakry district. Initial attractiveness control variables are: number of European Settlers per 
100,000 population in 1910, and commercial taxes per capita collected in 1914. Colonial conquest control variables are: year 
French troops arrived to begin the conquest, length of African resistance to colonial conquest (simple and squared), and indem-
nities paid to pre-colonial African chiefs. Pre-colonial characteristics control variables are: presence of a centralized political 
power, presence of a European trade counter, and initial population density. Geographical characteristics control variables are: 
annual rainfalls average from 1915–1975, altitude, longitude, latitude, presence of a coastal border, and presence of an important 
river. Teachers, medical staff, public works expenses and local chiefs’ wages per population unit over period t are annual means 
over period t. Hostility toward colonial power from 1920–1940 represents the annual mean of the numbers of events expressing 
hostility toward colonial power from 1920–1940. New teachers (respectively schools) per 100,000 hbt from 1930–1939 represent 
the difference in the annual mean of the number of teachers (respectively schools) from 1930–1939 and 1910–1928.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
VoL. 1 No. 2 203hUILLEry: hIsTory mATTErs
52 districts,16 I can calculate the proportion of households living within 30 minutes 
from a primary school, a medical center, and drinkable water. Figures 8A, 8B, and 
8C show that the current distance to public goods is still correlated to early colonial 
public investments. The repetition of investment location between 1910 and 1995 
was sufficiently large to make early differences still sensitive, which makes me think 
that repetition was not just limited to the next period (1930–1939).
I propose to explore what could explain why more teachers were posted in areas 
that already had many of them, and to test some of the potential mechanisms. One 
explanation could be that the same practice appears as more valuable for new adop-
ters thanks to increasing returns to the adoption of this practice, or because of costs 
in changing from an established practice to a different one. Increasing returns may be 
due to externalities across investments. If there are more roads in a district, it is easier 
to have teachers and/or students come here. Alternatively, if there are more doctors, 
people are healthier and children are more likely to attend school. But the data does 
not confirm this. In columns 4 and 5 of Table 6, I include the other investments from 
1910–1928 as additional regressors to the number of teachers per 100,000 inhabit-
ants from 1910–1928. This specification also allows for assessing whether the other 
investments explain the observed correlation between early and later investments 
in education. They had a negative impact on the number of new teachers from 
1930–1939, which could reflect substitutability rather than complementarity.
Increasing returns could also arise because of the lasting nature of physical facili-
ties. It is cheaper to post a new teacher in an existing school than to build a new 
16 These are the Senegalese, Malian, Nigerian, and Burkinabè districts. 
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Figure 8. The Relation between Colonial Investments and Current Access to Public Goods 
(panel A: Access to a primary school in 1995)
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school for her. If this is true, we expect the number of teachers per school to increase 
over time. Figure 9 represents the evolution of the number of teachers per school 
between 1910 and 1953, using data on both the number of teachers and the number of 
schools per district. It is clear that this is a part of the story. The number of teachers 
per school jumped from one to four between 1910 and 1953. In columns 6 and 7 of 
Table 6, I include the number of new schools per 100,000 inhabitants from 1930–
1939 as an additional regressor. This does not alter the coefficient on the number of 
teachers per 100,000 inhabitants from 1910–1928, which shows not only that more 
new teachers were posted in districts that already had many of them, but also that 
more new teachers were posted in schools that already had many of them. This 
observation is also consistent with explanations other than the lower cost of using 
existing physical facilities. Some positive social interactions such as peer-effects or 
intergenerational externalities can explain that a more educated population produces 
a higher demand for education (see Dominique Goux and Eric Maurin 2007 for an 
empirical analysis on peer effects and Flavio Cunha and James Heckman 2007 for a 
theoretical argument of intergenerational externalities). The increase in the number 
of teachers per school might also reflect an increase in local demand for education 
due to endogenous accumulation of human capital; a higher supply of human capital 
in period 1 encouraged investment in human capital-related activities, which, in turn, 
encouraged an increase in demand for schooling in period 2 (Acemoglu 2002). More 
generally, the fact that the new teachers were more likely to be posted in existing 
schools may reflect any local increase in demand due to positive externalities. But 
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these externalities have to be very limited in terms of spatial spreading to be consist-
ent with the fact that many new teachers were posted in existing schools rather than 
in new schools that could potentially be built in the nearby area.
I also test whether some positive political externalities explain the fact that more 
teachers were posted in districts that already had many of them. Early investments 
could have created some positive effects on political voice, as discussed in Banerjee 
et al. (2008). They relate that the political voice of particular groups may affect public 
goods provision. The idea is that a group with higher political voice is able to appro-
priate a larger share of the newly provided public goods. In the colonial context, it 
could be plausible that some districts with more public goods in period 1 acquired a 
stronger political voice and therefore appropriated a larger share of the new teachers 
in period 2, explaining why new teachers in period 2 were posted in areas that had 
many of them in period 1. It is well-known that French administrators set up a direct 
rule over the colonies regardless of the pre-colonial political structures. But after 
the first period of conquest and administrative settling, the colonial power changed 
its mind about the optimal “indigenous policy,” since they realized that the control 
of large territories and large populations demanded more administrative forces than 
offered solely by French people. Since 1920, some local chiefs have been progres-
sively associated in the colonial administration as intermediaries between local popu-
lations and French administrators. It is possible that local chiefs were easier to recruit 
in places that got more public goods in early colonial times (due to higher human 
capital) than in places that got few public goods in early colonial times. As African 
local chiefs increased the political voice of their groups (they could defend their inter-
ests in the opinion of the French administrator) districts with a larger association of 
local chiefs might appropriate a larger share of newly provided public goods. To test 
this potential mechanism, I use the amount of local chiefs’ wages reported in colo-
nial budgets as a proxy of local chiefs association. The larger the local chiefs’ wages, 
the more associated. Table 6, column 8 reports the coefficients of the regression of 
the number of new teachers per 100,000 inhabitants from 1930–1939 on the amount 
of local chiefs wages per 100,000 inhabitants from 1930–1939. In column 9, I add 
geographical, pre-colonial, conquest, and initial attractiveness variables as control 
variables. In both columns, results show that the amount of local chiefs’ wages is 
correlated positively with the number of new teachers from 1930–1939, but the coef-
ficient is not significant (t-statistic = 1.28). Moreover, we can see that the coefficient 
on the number of teachers per 100,000 inhabitants from 1910–1928 remains exactly 
the same, so this story does not explain why more teachers were posted in districts 
that already had many of them.
Finally, public investments in an area might lead to a more stable political environ-
ment, which makes it easier to provide facilities in the future. Since I collected data on 
the political climate at the district level,17 I include an index of political instability as 
an additional regressor in columns 10 and 11. This index is the average annual number 
of severe events expressing hostility toward colonial power from 1920–1940. If there 
are political positive externalities, we expect political instability from 1920–1940 to 
17 I collected data on political climate at the district level from the annual political reports written to the gov-
ernor by the district administrators. For further details on data collection and method, refer to Huillery (2008). 
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have a negative impact on the number of new teachers per 100,000 inhabitants from 
1930–1939. Data says the opposite. The more hostile, the more new teachers (perhaps 
to satisfy population expectations and calm the political situation). Moreover, given 
the level of hostility from 1906–1920, more teachers from 1910–1928 had a negative 
impact on hostility from 1920–1940 (results not shown). These findings tell us that 
colonial power may have invested more in hostile areas for political purposes, which 
effectively had a positive impact on political climate. Once again, the inclusion of 
the index of political instability does not alter the impact of the number of teachers 
per 100,000 inhabitants from 1910–1928 on the number of new teachers per 100,000 
inhabitants from 1930–1939. Therefore, political externalities do not explain why more 
teachers were posted in districts that already had many of them.
The scarcity of data makes it impossible to pin down the precise channels under-
lying the relationship with any reasonable degree of certainty. I can just eliminate 
some stories as positive externalities across investments and positive effects on 
the political stability. A political economy idea that investment is associated with 
political power remains plausible but does not capture much of the mechanism. My 
important finding is that many new teachers joined existing facilities, which is con-
sistent with both the lasting nature of physical facilities and (very local) positive 
externalities on the demand for education.
I do not have a clear explanation for the persistence of public investments but 
I have strong evidence that teachers continued to go where teachers used to be 
affected. Large long-term effects of early colonial investments are thus explained by 
the repetition of colonial (and apparently post-colonial) investment location. Early 
small events or historical accidents might have large effects on later outcomes. There 
may not have been any particular reason to prefer one place to another before public 
investments took place (as discussed in Section IVA), but as they have become con-
centrated in one place, any new entrant elsewhere could have been at a disadvantage, 
and, therefore, might have tended to move into the hub if possible, further increas-
ing the hub’s relative efficiency. The mechanism at work is a “virtuous cycle” effect 
which can explain why small but early public investments in some districts became 
larger over time and led to very large returns today.
VI. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to assess the long-term effects of history on devel-
opment and the influence of colonial experience in West Africa. While the political 
economy literature is insisting, rightly, on “institutional overhang” and the persist-
ence of bad institutions, this paper shows that the persistence of colonial experience 
may be more local, since public investments continued to beget more investments 
and better current outcomes at the district level. Adding one teacher (respectively, 
doctor) per 100,000 inhabitants in the early colonial period would lead to 1 (respec-
tively, 0.5) additional percentage point of school enrollment (respectively, stunting 
children). Adding one franc per capita in public works in the early colonial period 
would lead to about 3 additional percentage points of access to the private water 
tap and modern fuel. The paper also shows that the nature of public investments 
matters: current educational performances are specifically determined by colonial 
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investments in education, as current health performances is by colonial investments 
in health and  current  infrastructures’ development is by colonial investments in 
infrastructures and health. According to our estimates, the enduring influence of 
early colonial investments can be explained by the fact that later investments con-
tinued to be located in areas that already had many of them. The more investments 
from 1910–1928, the more new investments from 1930–1939, and the more public 
goods today. Thus, this paper contributes to explicit the mechanisms through which 
spatial inequalities arise and persist, and gives evidence that, even in the long run, 
inequalities do not vanish because there are increasing returns to the adoption of a 
practice, and because both starting point and accidental events can have significant 
effects on the ultimate outcome.
Appendix 1: Data Description and Sources
A. 1995 performances
Data on current performances come from national household surveys: EPCV 
(1998) for Upper Volta, ESAM II (2000) for Senegal, EIBC (1994) for Guinea, 
EPCES (1995) for Niger, EMCES (1994) for Mali, EPDS (1993) for Ivory Coast, and 
EPCV (1995) for Mauritania.
These surveys report the localities where people live. I collected the geographical 
coordinates of household localities on the Web site of Falling Rain Genomics (http://
www.fallingrain.com/world/). Then I matched localities’ geographical coordinates 
with 1925 colonial districts maps that I found at the Documentation Française in 
Paris. This allowed me to compute statistics on current development at the colonial 
district level. I used statistical weights associated with the households in the survey, 
which is not ideal because these weights have been computed to make the sample 
representative at the national level and not at the district level.
proportion of 7–12-year-old Children Attending school.—This variable is the 
ratio of the number of 7–12-year-old children attending school to the total number of 
7–12-year-old children in the district.
proportion of 0–5-year-old Children suffering from stunting.—This variable is 
the ratio of the number of 0–5-year-old children suffering from stunting to the total 
number of 0–5-year-old children in the district. Household surveys report the height 
and the weight of the 0–5-year-old children. I used international standards asso-
ciated with each age (measured in months) to calculate the proportion of stunted 
children in each district. A child is said to suffer from stunting if her height is less 
than two standard errors under the median height.
proportion of households Connected to Electricity.—This variable is the propor-
tion of households in the district that live in a house connected to electricity.
proportion of households having Access to a private Water Tap.—This variable 
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is the proportion of households in the district that live in a house with a private water 
tap, as opposed to having public fountains or natural sources.
proportion of households Using a modern Fuel.—This variable is the proportion 
of households in the district that use a modern fuel for cooking, namely, gas, coal, or 
electricity, as opposed to natural fuels.
proportion of households Living within 30 minutes from a primary school 
(medical Center, drinkable Water).—This variable is the proportion of households 
in the district for whom it takes less than 30 minutes to go to a primary school, 
or are located less than 3km from a primary school (respectively, medical center, 
drinkable water).
B. Colonial period
All data on colonial period, except hostility toward colonial power, come from 
the annual colonial budgets. In this paper, I use data from each year from 1910 to 
1920, and also data from 1923, 1925, 1928, 1930, 1933, 1936, and 1939. The vol-
umes from 1910 to 1928 are located in Dakar (Archives Nationales du Sénégal), the 
later in Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale Française). Colonial budgets were presented 
at the colony level but often detailed the distribution of public goods, administrative 
staff, and security expenses among districts, which allowed me to construct statis-
tics at the district level. Since district borders evolved over time, I had to choose a 
constant unit of observation and chose the districts as they stood in 1925. Original 
district-level data found in local budgets had to be adjusted to our constant statisti-
cal unit which is 1925 districts. I used information on territorial modifications from 
colonies’ annual political reports18 or localities’ names mentioned in local budgets 
to know whether district borders were modified. Fortunately, the colonial budgets 
often detailed the distribution of public resources at the local level. In this case, the 
location of localities on 1925 colonial maps allowed me to reorganize district level 
data according to 1925 district configurations.
Number of Teachers per 100,000 Inhabitants from 1910–1928.—This variable 
is the average annual number of teachers from 1910–1928, divided by 1925 total 
population, per 100,000 inhabitants units. The teachers reported in colonial budgets 
were those assigned to public schools only.
medical staff per 100,000 Inhabitants from 1910–1928.—This variable is the 
average annual number of doctors, nurses, and medical auxiliaries from 1910–1928 
divided by 1925 total population per 100,000 inhabitants’ units. The doctors, nurses, 
and medical auxiliaries reported in colonial budgets were those affected to public 
medical centers only.
18 These reports can be found at the Archives Nationales in Paris. They were written by the lieutenant gover-
nors to inform the general governor of the colonies’ political and administrative situation.
210 AmErICAN ECoNomIC JoUrNAL: AppLIEd ECoNomICs AprIL 2009
public Works Expenses per Capita from 1910–1928.—This variable is the aver-
age annual amount of public expenses devoted to public works materials from 
1910–1928, divided by 1925 total population, per 100,000 inhabitants’ units. These 
expenses cover materials for the building and reparation of roads, bridges, housing, 
ports, airports, wells, sanitation, and electrcity. Since the public works workforce 
was nourished by coerced labor, public works materials represented the major cost 
of colonial investments in infrastructure.
New Teachers per 100,000 Inhabitants from 1930–1939.—This variable is the 
difference between the average annual number of teachers from 1930–1939 and the 
average annual number of teachers from 1910–1928 divided by 1925 total population 
per 100,000 inhabitants’ units. The teachers reported in colonial budgets were those 
affected to public schools only.
New schools per 100,000 Inhabitants from 1930–1939.—This variable is the dif-
ference between the average annual number of schools from 1930–1939 and the 
average annual number of schools from 1910–1928, divided by 1925 total popula-
tion, per 100,000 inhabitants’ units. The schools reported in colonial budgets were 
public schools only.
Number of Teachers per school at Time t.—This variable is the mean of the num-
ber of teachers divided by the number of schools in the districts.
Local Chiefs’ Wages per 100,000 Inhabitants from 1930–1939.—This variable 
is the average annual amount of wages paid to local chiefs enrolled in the colonial 
administration from 1910–1928. The local chiefs had to play the role of inter-
mediary between the French administrator and the population, especially for tax 
collection and recruitment of military forces. Their wages varied according to the 
size of the population they oversaw, but also according to their pre-colonial legiti-
macy and tribute. Local chiefs descending from pre-colonial kingdoms received 
higher wages than those who were not from a royal family.
hostility toward Colonial power from 1920–1940.—This variable is the average 
annual number of severe events expressing hostility from local population or local 
chiefs toward colonial power. Data on political events during colonial times comes 
from the annual political reports written by the French administrators to the colony 
governor. I coded events reported by the administrators in their reports and clas-
sified events expressing hostility into three classes: benign, moderate, and severe. 
Severe events are those that emerged from the major part of the population and 
necessitated an intervention from colonial power. Hostility toward colonial power 
expressed through refusal to pay taxes, refusal to enroll in military forces, refusal to 
do coerced labor, refusal to obey colonial rules, riots, or rebellions. It differs from 
resistance to colonial conquest which concerned African peoples’ reactions during 
conquest, whereas hostility refers to African peoples’ attitude.
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C. Early European settlement
Number of European settlers per 100,000 Inhabitants in 1910.—This variable 
is the number of European settlers around 1910, divided by the total population, 
per 100,000 units around 1910. District-level data on 1910 European settlers and on 
local population comes from colonial censuses, Archives Nationales, Fond Afrique 
Occidentale Française, série G, sous-série 22, Paris. In 1910, European people repre-
sented, on average, 0.1 percent of a districts’ population (52 Europeans per district), 
which was extremely low overall, as was the case in most of the African colonies 
except North and South Africa.
D. Conquest Characteristics
year of Colonial Conquest’s Beginning.—I collected district-level data on 
French military expansion using French military archives (Pierre Deloncle 1934, 
Albert Alfred Louis Duboc 1939). These authors relate the timing of colonial con-
quest and allow me to compute the year colonial military forces arrived in each 
district. It varied from 1854 for some Senegalese districts to 1903 for the district 
of Agadez (Niger).
Local resistance to Colonial Conquest Length.—Data on African peoples’ 
resistance to colonial conquest come from Pierre Deloncle (1934), Albert Duboc 
(1939), Jean Suret-Canale (1964), Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime (1970), Joseph 
Ki-Zerbo (1978). I collected two dates to measure the length of African resistance: 
year of French military troops’ arrival, and year of the last military intervention for 
district pacification. I use the difference between these two dates as a measure of the 
districts’ length of African resistance. Data exhibit an average length of resistance 
of 23 years, which is much longer than what we are told about colonial history. 
Differences in lengths of resistance are quite important. Some districts posed no 
resistance to the colonial power (district of Indénié in Ivory Coast, former Europeans 
trading counters), whereas others resisted more than 50 years (Casamance in Senegal, 
northern Mauritanian districts and middle-east of Benin).
Local Chiefs’ Indemnities.—This variable is the average amount of indemnities 
paid to pre-colonial chiefs in exchange for their acknowledgement of the superiority 
of the colonial power. The indemnities had nothing to do with the association of local 
chiefs in the colonial administration, which was implemented far later. They just 
rewarded some of the pre-colonial local chiefs who agreed to resign. These indemni-
ties are reported in the colonial budgets under the category “political expenses.”
E. pre-colonial Characteristics
Centralized political power dummy.—Pre-colonial political context can be syn-
thesized in two types of districts: those under a centralized political power (state 
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societies), and those under no centralized political power (stateless societies). Data on 
pre-colonial kingdoms and empires come from several historian sources: Suret-Canale 
(1964), Marcel Chailley (1968), Adu A. Boahen (1989), Bouche (1991), Catherine 
Coquery-Vidrovitch and Henri Moniot (1993), Curtin et al. (1995). I constructed a 
dummy for the presence of a pre-colonial centralized political power that determines 
“state” and “stateless” districts. Districts sheltering a kingdom during the nineteenth 
century are classified as “state” districts.
1910 population density.—This variable is the 1910 local population divided 
by land area. District-level data on 1910 local population comes from colonial 
censuses, Archives Nationales, Fond Afrique Occidentale Française, and série G, 
sous-série 22, Paris. It is more common to divide total population by arable area, 
but some districts are in the desert and therefore have no arable land.
Trade Taxes Collected in 1914.—This variable is the amount of trade taxes col-
lected in the district in 1914. Trade taxes were introduced during the 1900s and 
regarded all secondary and tertiary activities. Tariffs depended on a firms’ activ-
ity and number of employees. This variable allows me to measure the economic 
prosperity in addition to population density. Data on trade taxes collected in each 
district come from the annual colonial budgets.
European Trade Counter dummy.—This variable equals one if the district shel-
tered a former European trade counter, and zero otherwise. Data on former trade 
counters come from Curtin et al. (1995).
F. Geographical Characteristics
Altitude.—This variable is the altitude of the main town in each district. The 
main town in the district corresponds to the colonial “Chef-lieu,” which is indi-
cated on the 1925 colonial maps found in the Documentation Française, Paris. 
Data on altitude come from the Web site of Falling Rain Genomics.
Latitude.—This variable is the average latitude of the localities where house-
holds included in the national surveys are located. Data on the latitude of each 
locality come from the Web site of Falling Rain Genomics.
Longitude.—This variable is the average longitude of the localities where house-
holds included in the national surveys are located. Data on the longitude of each 
locality come from the Web site of Falling Rain Genomics.
Annual rainfalls.—This variable is the average annual precipitation in the main 
town of each district from 1915–1975. The main town in the district corresponds to 
the colonial “Chef-lieu,” which is indicated on the 1925 colonial maps found in the 
Documentation Française, Paris. Data on annual precipitation in each “Chef-lieu” 
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come from a database collected by ORSTOM which gives the annual precipitation 
on many towns in Africa from 1915–1975.
Coastal dummy.—This variable equals to one if the district has access to sea, 
zero otherwise. Data on coastal borders come from the 1925 colonial maps found at 
the Documentation Française, Paris.
river dummy.—This variable equals one if the district has a navigable river, zero 
otherwise. Data on important rivers come from the 1925 colonial maps found at the 
Documentation Française, Paris.
distance from the Coast.—This variable is the distance from the coast of the 
main town in each district. The main town of the district corresponds to the colonial 
“Chef-lieu,” which is indicated on the 1925 colonial maps found in the Documentation 
Française, Paris. I also used these maps to calculate the distance from the coast of 
each “Chef-lieu.”
Appendix 2: Matching Procedure
A. definition of Neighborhoods
An intuitive definition of neighbor districts would be “districts that share a common 
border” (Banerjee and Iyer 2005 use this definition with a similar empirical context 
to mine). But the problem with this naïve definition is that neighborhoods overlap. 
For instance, you can see on the right side of Figure 3 that both Nguigmi and Zinder 
are neighbors of Goure but are not neighbors themselves. Nguigmi’s neighborhood 
and Zinder’s neighborhood therefore overlap. They both contain Goure. In this case, 
assuming that neighbor districts share similar unobservable characteristics would 
simply imply that all districts share similar unobservable characteristics because 
every neighborhood shares common districts with another neighborhood. Therefore, 
the naïve assumption that districts sharing a common border share similar unobserv-
able characteristics is not convenient in this context of overlapping neighborhoods.
In order to circumvent this problem, I need a definition of neighbor districts that 
creates disjointed neighborhoods. I define a neighborhood as a cluster of three dis-
tricts that share a common border and assume that districts belonging to the same 
cluster share similar unobservable characteristics, whereas districts belonging to dif-
ferent clusters do not necessarily share similar unobservable characteristics, even if 
they share a common border.19 Neighborhood fixed effect is similar within but not 
between clusters. This leads to dividing district maps into disjointed neighborhoods, 
which are sets of three districts sharing a common border.
19 I admit that the number, three districts, used to define neighborhoods is arbitrary and could be changed. 
The fewer districts in a neighborhood, the weaker the hypothesis on unobservable characteristics. But reducing 
the number of districts in a neighborhood also reduces the number of observations in the sample to test equation 
(3). I therefore chose to cluster districts three-by-three rather than two-by-two to keep a reasonable number of 
observations in the sample.
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B. Construction of Neighborhoods
Since there are several possible partitions of the districts into disjointed neighbor-
hoods, I compute neighborhoods by randomly assigning two districts that share a 
common border to a district. This method potentially keeps some districts out of any 
neighborhood. When all the districts that share a common border already belong to a 
neighborhood, a district remains alone. In this case, I randomly choose to assign this 
district to one of the nearby neighborhoods. As a result, most of the neighborhoods 
contain three districts, but some contain four districts.
Since I do not want estimates of equation (3) to be driven by a particular neigh-
borhood’s design, I run regressions with 50 random neighborhood designs.20 For 
each neighborhood design, I construct a dataset containing neighbor districts’ dif-
ferentials. In order to avoid redundant observations, I keep two differentials for 
three-district neighborhoods and three differentials for four-district neighborhoods. 
This produces samples of district differentials containing between 65 and 80 obser-
vations, with a mean size of 71 observations. For each of the 50 neighborhoods’ 
designs, the estimate for equation (3) provides estimates of β and γ.
C. Econometric Estimates
I use the empirical mean of the 50 estimates of β (respectively γ) as an estimate 
of β (respectively γ), and the empirical standard deviation of the 50 estimates of β 
(respectively γ) as an estimate of the standard deviation of β (respectively γ). Since 
OLS estimators are normally distributed and unbiased, these estimators are unbi-
ased and convergent.
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